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a b s t r a c t
In computer networks and social networks, the betweenness centrality of a node measures
the amount of information passing through the node when all pairs are conducting
shortest path exchanges. In this paper, we introduce a strategic network formation game
in which nodes build connections subject to a budget constraint in order to maximize
their betweenness in the network. To reflect real world scenarios where short paths are
more important in information exchange in the network, we generalize the betweenness
definition to only count shortest paths with a length limit ℓ in betweenness calculation.
We refer to this game as the bounded budget betweenness centrality game and denote it as
ℓ-B3C game, where ℓ is the path length constraint parameter.
We present both complexity and constructive existence results about Nash equilibria
of the game. For the nonuniform version of the game where node budgets, link costs, and
pairwise communicationweightsmay vary,we show thatNash equilibriamaynot exist and
it is NP-hard to decide whether Nash equilibria exist in a game instance. For the uniform
version of the game where link costs and pairwise communication weights are one and
each node can build k links, we construct two families of Nash equilibria based on shift
graphs, and study the properties of Nash equilibria. Moreover, we study the complexity of
computing best responses and show that the task is polynomial for uniform 2-B3C games
and NP-hard for other games (i.e. uniform ℓ-B3C games with ℓ ≥ 3 and nonuniform ℓ-B3C
games with ℓ ≥ 2).
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many network structures in real life are not designed by central authorities. Instead, they are formed by autonomous
agents who often have selfish motives [19]. Typical examples of such networks include the Internet where autonomous
systems linked together to achieve global connection, peer-to-peer networks where peers connect to one another for online
file sharing (e.g. [5,22]), and social networks where individuals connect to one another for information exchange and other
social functions [21]. Since these autonomous agents have their selfish motives and are not under any centralized control,
they often act strategically in deciding whom to connect to in order to improve their own benefits. This gives rise to the field
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of network formation games, which studies the game-theoretic properties of the networks formed by these selfish agents as
well as the process in which all agents dynamically adjust their strategies [1,10,15–17].
A key measure of importance of a node is its betweenness centrality. The betweenness centrality (or betweenness for
short) is introduced originally from social network analysis as one of themeasures on how central an individual is in a social
network [12,18]. If we view a network as a graph G = (V , E) (directed or undirected), the betweenness of a node (or vertex)
i in G is
btwi(G) =
−
u≠v≠i∈V ,m(u,v)>0
w(u, v)
mi(u, v)
m(u, v)
(1)
where m(u, v) is the number of shortest paths from u to v in G, mi(u, v) is the number of shortest paths from u to v that
pass i in G (all shortest paths are with respect to the number of edges on the paths), andw(u, v) is the weight on pair (u, v).
Intuitively, if the amount of information from u to v isw(u, v), and the information is passed along the shortest paths from
u to v, and all shortest paths split the traffic equally, then the betweenness of node i measures the amount of information
passing through i incurred by all pair-wise exchanges.
In this paper, we generalize the betweenness definition with a parameter ℓ such that only shortest paths with length at
most ℓ are considered in betweenness calculation. Formally, we define
btwi(G, ℓ) =
−
u≠v≠i∈V ,m(u,v,ℓ)>0
w(u, v)
mi(u, v, ℓ)
m(u, v, ℓ)
, (2)
where m(u, v, ℓ) is the number of shortest paths from u to v in G with length at most ℓ, and mi(u, v, ℓ) is the number of
shortest paths from u to v that passes i in G with length at most ℓ. It is easy to see that btwi(G) = btwi(G, n− 1), where n
is the number of vertices in G.
Betweenness with path length constraint is reasonable in real-world scenarios. In social networks, researches (e.g. [2,3])
show that short connections are much more important than long-range connections. In fact, results of [2,3] motivate
Kleinberg et al. to consider essentially btwi(G, 2) as part of the objective function in their game [15]. In other scenarios,
shortest paths with length l > 2 are also considered in the analysis. For example in peer-to-peer networks such as
Gnetella [22], query requests are searched only on nodes with a short graph distance (but greater than 2) away from the
query initiator. In social networks, shortest paths of more than 2 could also be important. For example, consider the recent
DARPA network challenge [7], where Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) asked the registered teams to
identify the locations of 10 weather balloons in the continental US as fast as possible. The winning team from MIT media
lab used incentives and social networking to recruit almost 5000 people in about 36 hours. The depths of their recruitment
trees ranges from 2 to 14, showing that paths longer than 2 are also important for information dissemination [20]. Therefore,
we believe it is reasonable to consider shortest paths with length greater than 2 in the betweenness computation, and our
definition btwi(G, ℓ) can be viewed as a generalization of [15] in this regard.
In a decentralized network with autonomous agents, each agent may have incentive to maximize its betweenness in the
network. For example, in computer networks and peer-to-peer networks, a node in the network may be able to charge the
traffic that it helps relaying, in which case the revenue of the node is proportional to its betweenness in the network. So the
maximization of revenue is consistent with the maximization of the betweenness. In a social network, an individual may
want to gain or control the most amount of information traveling in the network by maximizing her betweenness. Again
considering the DARPA network challenge, we can see that individuals with high betweenness in the social network is more
likely to collect reward money since more information diffusion paths pass through them. Therefore, individuals do have
incentives to increase their betweenness in a social network.
In this paper, we introduce a network formation game in which every node in a network is a selfish agent who decides
which other nodes in the network to build connectionwith in order tomaximize its own betweenness. Building connections
with other nodes incur costs. Each node has a budget such that the cost of building its connections cannot exceed its budget.
We call this game the bounded budget betweenness centrality game or the B3C game. When distinction is necessary, we use
ℓ-B3C to denote the games using generalized betweenness definition btwi(G, ℓ).
Bounded budget assumption, first incorporated into a network formation game in [16], reflects real world scenarios
where there are physical limits to the number of connections one can make. In computer and peer-to-peer networks, each
node usually has a connection limit. In social networks, each individual only has a limited time and energy to create and
maintain direct relationships with other individuals, which is referred to as the Dunbar limit in sociology literature [9]. An
alternative treatment to connection costs appearing in more studies [1,10,15,17] is to subtract connection costs from the
main objectives to bemaximized,whichmeans that as long as the benefit outweighs the cost, a node is allowed to buildmore
connections without other physical constraints. This treatment, however, restricts the variety of Nash equilibria exhibited
by the game. For example, Kleinberg et al. [15] show that all Nash equilibria in their network formation game (with a social
network background) are dense graphs with at least Ω(n2) number of edges for graphs with n vertices, because the game
has no connection budget constraint. However, it is well known that social networks are sparse graphs, since individuals
have physical constraints and thus can only build connections with a relatively small number of people. Therefore, in this
paper we explicitly incorporate the bounded budget assumption to overcome the shortcomings existed in prior work such
as [15], even though it makes the game model more complicated.
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In this paper, we consider the directed graph variant of the game, in which links in the network are directed and nodes
can establish outgoing links to other nodes. This is suitable for computer networks and peer-to-peer networks that relay
traffics, in which downloading and uploading links are often not symmetric, as also modeled by [16]. In social networks,
the relationship between a pair of individuals in terms of information exchange may not be symmetric, especially if the
relationship was built by the unilateral effort of one individual with some selfish incentive. One concrete example is the
Twitter follower network, in which users choose which other users to follow, and the follower–followee relationship is
asymmetric.1 Therefore, it is reasonable to use the directed graph model in our betweenness game.
Our results.We focus on the algorithmic aspect of computing Nash equilibria aswell as their structures in the B3C games.
Since the game allows some trivial Nash equilibria (such as a network with no links at all), we study a stronger form called
maximal Nash equilibria, in which no node can add more outgoing links without exceeding its budget constraint. Since
adding outgoing links of a node can only help its betweenness, it is reasonable to study maximal Nash equilibria in the B3C
games.
We present both complexity results and existence results about this game. We first show that the general nonuniform
ℓ-B3C game may not have any maximal Nash equilibria for any ℓ ≥ 2. A nonuniform ℓ-B3C game is specified by several
parameters concerning the node budgets, link costs, and pairwise communication weights (see Section 2 for a formal
definition). Moreover, given these parameters as input, we show that it is NP-hard to determine whether the game has
a maximal Nash equilibrium. The result indicates that finding Nash equilibria in general ℓ-B3C games is a difficult task.
We then address the complexity of computing best responses in ℓ-B3C games. For uniform ℓ-B3C games where all pair
weights are one, all link costs are one, and all node budgets are given as an integer k, we show that with ℓ = 2, computing
a best response takes O(n3) time. For all other cases (uniform games with ℓ ≥ 3 or nonuniform games with ℓ ≥ 2), the task
is NP-hard.
Next, we turn our attention to the construction of Nash equilibria in uniform ℓ-B3C games and their properties. We
introduce a type of multi-partite graphs that we call shift graphs, which are variants of better known De Bruijn graphs and
Kautz graphs [8]. Based on these shift graphs, we construct two different families of Nash equilibria for uniform ℓ-B3C games.
One family gives a stronger form of Nash equilibria call strict Nash equilibria, while the other family belongs to what we call
ℓ-path-unique graphs (ℓ-PUGs), which we show are always Nash equilibria for uniform ℓ-B3C games.
Finally, we use ℓ-PUGs to study several properties of Nash equilibria. In particular, we show that (a) for any ℓ, k and large
enough n (n ≥ (k+ℓ)!/k!), a maximal Nash equilibrium exists; (b) Nash equilibria may exhibit rich structures, e.g. theymay
be disconnected or unbalanced (some nodes have zero in-degree and zero betweenness while other nodes have very large
in-degree andbetweenness); and (c) for 2-B3Cgames,when the in-degree are relatively balanced allmaximalNash equilibria
must be 2-PUGs, a direct consequence of which is that Abelian Cayley graphs with sufficiently large n (n ≥ k3 + k2 + 2k)
cannot be Nash equilibria for 2-B3C games.
Whenever applicable, we also state the results for B3C games without the path length constraint.
To summarize, our contributions include: (a) we define the bounded budget betweenness centrality game to study the
strategic network formation with maximizing betweenness as the goal, and we are the first to incorporate reasonable
assumptions of both bounded budget and general path length constraint into betweenness related games; (b) we show
that in the general version of the game where budgets, link costs and pairwise betweenness contribution may vary, Nash
equilibria may not exist and it is NP-hard to decide if a game instance has a Nash equilibrium; (c) we show that computing
best responses is polynomial-time solvable for uniform 2-B3C games and is NP-hard for other variants; (d) for the uniform
ℓ-B3C games, we explicitly construct families of Nash equilibria and provide several features about Nash equilibria in these
games. We hope that this research will motivate further studies on betweenness related network formation games.
Related work. There are a number of studies on network formation games with Nash equilibrium as the solution
concept [1,10,15–17]. Most of the above work belong to a class of games in which nodes try to minimize their average
shortest distances to other nodes in the network [1,10,16,17], which is called closeness centrality in social network
analysis [12]. The game in [10] considers undirected edges and the cost of links in the network are part of the objective
function to minimize. It focuses on the study of price of anarchy of the game and also presents results on the structure
of Nash equilibria. In [1], Albers et al. extend the research of [10] by disproving a conjecture made in [10] that all Nash
equilibria have a tree structure, and studying other variants of the game including the cost of an edge being shared by two
end nodes. The game in [17] instead considers minimizing the average stretch of each node, where stretch is defined as the
ratio between the shortest path distance of two nodes in the graph versus the geometric distance in the underlying space.
Our research is partlymotivated by thework of [15], in which Kleinberg et al. study a different type of network formation
games related to the concept of structural holes in organizational social network research. In this game, each node tries to
bridge other pairs of nodes that are not directly connected. In a sense, this is a restricted type of betweenness where only
length-two shortest paths are considered. Besides some difference in the game setup, such as they use undirected edges,
there are two important differences between ourwork and theirs. First, we consider betweennesswith a general path length
constraint of ℓ as well as no path length constraints, while they only consider the bridging effect between two immediate
1 In the Twitter follower network, users are building incoming links since they receive tweets (microblog posts) from people whom they follow. In
Section 2 we will explain that building incoming links are equivalent as building outgoing links in terms of the game format.
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neighbors of a node. For the case of ℓ = 2, both studies include results showing that computing best response is polynomial-
time solvable, but their work does not show in their non-uniform case if Nash equilibrium exists and whether deciding the
existence of Nash equilibria is NP-hard, while we have results on both. Second, we incorporate budget constraints to restrict
the number of links one node can build, while their work has not such constraint. As already discussed, without link budget
constraints, they show that all Nash equilibria are dense graphs with Ω(n2) edges where n is the number of vertices. This
is what we want to avoid in our study. A couple of other studies [4,13] also address strategic network formations with
structural holes, but they do not address the computation issue, and their game formats have their own limitations (e.g. star
networks as the only type of equilibria [13] or limited to length-2 paths [4]).
Our game is also inspired by the BBC game of Laoutaris et al. [16]. This game considers directed links and bounded budgets
on nodes, usingminimization of average shortest distances to others as the objective for each node. It shows hardness results
in determining the existence of Nash equilibria in general games, and provides tree-like structures as Nash equilibria for the
uniform version of the game. It also shows that Abelian Cayley graphs cannot be Nash equilibria in large networks.
Solution concepts other than Nash equilibrium are also used in the study of network formation games. Authors in [6,14]
consider games in which two end points of a link have to jointly agree on adding the link, and they use pairwise stability as
an alternative to Nash equilibrium.
Paper organization. Section 2 provides the detailed definition of the ℓ-B3C game and the related concepts. Section 3
provides the complexity result on determining the existence of Nash equilibria in nonuniform games, while Section 4
presents the results on the complexity of computing best responses. Section 5 presents the construction of Nash equilibria
in uniform games via shift graphs and studies the properties of Nash equilibria. We conclude the paper and discuss future
directions in Section 6.
2. Problem definition
We first define the bounded-budget betweenness centrality game (B3C game) without path length constraint, and then
extend it to the version with path constraint (ℓ-B3C game). A bounded-budget betweenness centrality game with parameters
(n, b, c, w) is a network formation game defined as follows. We consider a set of n players V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, which are also
nodes in a network. Function b : V → N specifies the budget b(i) for each node i ∈ V (N is the set of natural numbers).
Function c : V×V → N specifies the cost c(i, j) for the node i to establish a link to node j, for i, j ∈ V . Functionw : V×V → N
specifies the weight w(i, j) from node i to node j for i, j ∈ V , which can be interpreted as the amount of traffic i sends to j,
or the importance of the communication from i to j.2
The strategy space of player i in B3C game is Si = {si ⊆ V \ {i} | ∑j∈si c(i, j) ≤ b(i)}, i.e., all possible subsets of outgoing
links of node iwithin i’s budget. A strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S1× S2× · · ·× Sn is referred to as a configuration in
this paper. The graph induced by configuration s is denoted as Gs = (V , E), where E = {(i, j) | i ∈ V , j ∈ si}. For convenience,
we will also refer Gs as a configuration.
The utility of a node i in configuration s is defined by the betweenness centrality of i in the graph Gs as follows:
btwi(s) = btwi(Gs) =
−
u≠v≠i∈V ,m(u,v)>0
w(u, v)
mi(u, v)
m(u, v)
, (3)
wherem(u, v) is the number of shortest paths from u to v in Gs andmi(u, v) is the number of shortest paths from u to v that
passes i in Gs.
We now generalize the definition of betweenness, such that a shortest path from u to v contributes to the betweenness of
a node i on the path only when the path length is at most ℓ, for some parameter ℓ. Formally, given a graph Gs (corresponding
to a configuration s) and a parameter ℓ ∈ N, we define
btwi(Gs, ℓ) =
−
u≠v≠i∈V ,m(u,v,ℓ)>0
w(u, v)
mi(u, v, ℓ)
m(u, v, ℓ)
, (4)
where m(u, v, ℓ) is the number of shortest paths from u to v in Gs with length at most ℓ, and mi(u, v, ℓ) is the number of
shortest paths from u to v that passes i in Gs with length at most ℓ. Since the longest shortest path in Gs is at most n − 1,
we know that btwi(Gs) = btwi(Gs, n − 1). We use ℓ-B3C game to denote the version of B3C game with parameter ℓ and
btwi(Gs, ℓ) as the utility of node i.
Definition 1. A configuration s is a (pure) Nash equilibrium, if in s no node can increase its own utility by changing its own
strategy unilaterally, and we also say that s is stable.
Definition 2. A configuration s is a strict Nash equilibrium, if in s any strategy change of any node strictly decreases the utility
of the node.
2 We may also define a distance function specifying distances between every pair of nodes, but it is not needed throughout our paper.
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The following Lemma shows the monotonicity of betweenness centrality when adding new edges to a node, which
motivates our definition of maximal Nash equilibrium. It is stated for btwi(G) and B3C games, but is also applicable to
btwi(G, ℓ) and ℓ-B3C games. Its proof is straightforward and omitted.
Lemma 1. Adding an outgoing edge to a node i does not decrease i’s betweenness. That is, for any graph G = (V , E) with i ∈ V
and (i, j) ∉ E for some j ∈ V . Let G′ = (V , E ∪ {(i, j)}). Then btwi(G) ≤ btwi(G′).
Given a nonuniform B3C game with parameters (n, b, c, w), a maximal strategy of a node v is a strategy with which v
cannot add any outgoing edges without exceeding its budget. We say that a graph (configuration) ismaximal if all nodes use
maximal strategies in the configuration. By the monotonicity of betweenness centrality, it makes sense to study maximal
graphs where no node can add more edges within its budget limit. Moreover, some trivial non-maximal graphs are trivial
Nash equilibria, e.g. empty graphs with no edges. However, when nodes add more edges into the graph allowed by their
budgets, other nodes may have chance of improving their utilities by changing their strategies. Therefore, for the rest of the
paper, we focus onNash equilibria inmaximal graphs. In particular, we say that a configuration is amaximal Nash equilibrium
if it is a maximal graph and it is a Nash equilibrium.
The following lemma states the relationship between maximal Nash equilibria and strict Nash equilibria, a direct
consequence of the monotonicity of betweenness centrality.
Lemma 2. Given a B3C gamewith parameters (n, b, c, w), any strict Nash equilibrium in the game is amaximal Nash equilibrium.
Based on the above lemma, for positive existence of Nash equilibria, we sometimes study the existence of strict Nash
equilibria to make our results stronger.
We also consider a special case of B3C(or ℓ-B3C) game which is defined as following.
Definition 3. A B3C(or ℓ-B3C) game with parameters n, k ∈ N is uniform if b(i) = k for all i ∈ V , and c(i, j) = w(i, j) = 1
for all i, j ∈ V . As a contrast, the general form is called nonuniform games.
A remark is now in order concerning the directions of edges in the B3C (or ℓ-B3C) games. By our definition, each player
can build outgoing edges to other players. We may also define games in which each player can build incoming edges from
other players. Building incoming edges matches the scenario of the Twitter follower network, in which users select a set of
other users to follow, meaning to receive tweets from. We claim that these two formulations of the games are equivalent,
by the following observation. Let G be a graph and G′ be another graph obtained by reversing the directions of all edges
of G. Let w be a weight function on pairs of vertices in G, and let w′ be the weight function on pairs of vertices in G′ such
that w′(u, v) = w(v, u) for all pair of vertices u and v. Then we observe that for any vertex i its betweenness (with path
length constraint or not) in Gwith weight functionw is the same as in G′ with weight functionw′. This observation implies
that any game in which players build incoming edges is equivalent to another game in which players build outgoing edges.
Henceforth, we focus on one type of games in which players build outgoing edges, and all of our results apply directly to
games in which players build incoming edges.
3. Complexity of determining Nash equilibria in nonuniform games
Given the rich parameters, a nonuniform B3C game may have complex behavior. In particular, it may not have any
maximal (or strict) Nash equilibrium, and determining whether a game has a maximal (or strict) Nash equilibrium is NP-
hard.
For simplicity, themain part of this section addresses the B3C gamewithout path length constraint.We address the ℓ-B3C
game after each main result for the B3C game.
3.1. Nonexistence of maximal Nash equilibria
In this section, we show that maximal Nash equilibria may not exist in some version of B3C games where edge costs are
not uniform. By Lemma 2, it implies that strict Nash equilibria do not exist either in the same game.
We now construct a family of graphs, which we refer to as the gadget, and show that B3C games based on the gadget do
not have anymaximal Nash equilibrium. The gadget is shown in Fig. 1. There are 5+3t+ r nodes in the gadget, where t ∈ N
and r = 1, 2, 3. The values of t and r allow us to construct a graph of any size great than 5. There are r nodes, denoted as
A, A′, A′′ in the figure, which establish edges to B and C . Both B and C can establish at most one edge to a node in {D, E, F}
respectively. Each node in {D, E, F} connects to a cluster of size t each (not shown in the figure). The only requirement for
these three clusters is that they are identical to each other and are all strongly connected soD, E, F can reach all nodes in their
corresponding clusters. Nodes in the three clusters do not establish edges to the other clusters or to A, A′, A′′, B, C,D, E, F .
We classify nodes and edges as follows. Nodes B and C are flexible nodes since they can choose to connect one node in
{D, E, F}. Nodes D, E, F are triangle nodes, nodes in the clusters are cluster nodes, and nodes A, A′, A′′, are additional nodes.
Edges (i, j)with i ∈ {B, C} and j ∈ {D, E, F} are flexible edges. Other edges shown in the figure plus the edges in the clusters
are fixed edges. The remaining pairs with no edge connected (e.g. (A,D), (A, E), etc.) are referred to as forbidden edges.
We use the parameters (n, b, c, w) of a B3C game to realize the gadget. In particular, (a) n = 5+ 3t + r; (b) b(i) = 1 for
all i ∈ V ; (c) c(i, j) = 0 if (i, j) is a fixed edge, c(i, j) = 1 if (i, j) is a flexible edge, c(i, j) = M > 1 if (i, j) is a forbidden edge;
and (d)w(i, j) = 1 for all i, j ∈ V . Note that in the game only the edge costs are nonuniform.
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Fig. 1.Main structure of the gadget that has no maximal Nash equilibrium.
With the above construction, we can show the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The B3C game based on the gadget of Fig. 1 does not have any maximal Nash equilibrium. This implies that for any
n ≥ 6, there is an instance of B3C game with n players that does not have any maximal Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Note that in a maximal graph all fixed edges are included, and nodes B and C each selects one edge to connect to one
node in {D, E, F}. Consider one maximal graph G in which B connects to D and C connects to E (as in Fig. 1). Node B is on all
shortest paths from nodes in {A, A′, A′′} to D and the cluster D points to, but it is not on any shortest paths from nodes in
{A, A′, A′′} to E and F and the two clusters they point to (these shortest paths all pass through C). Thus btwB(G) = r(t + 1).
In this case, B can change its strategy to connect to F instead ofD, so that it will be on all shortest paths from those additional
nodes to F and D and their clusters, and thus its betweenness is increased to 2r(t + 1). Therefore, maximal graph G is not
stable.
The second case to consider is that both B and C connect to the same node, say E. In this case, they split equally among
all shortest paths from the additional nodes to the triangle nodes and the clusters nodes, giving each of them a betweenness
3r(t + 1)/2. In this case, each of them could improve their betweenness to 2r(t + 1) by connecting to F instead of E. Hence,
this maximal graph is not stable either.
All other maximal graphs are rotationally equivalent to one of the above two graphs. Therefore, we know that none of
the maximal graphs is stable, and the theorem holds. 
For the ℓ-B3C game with ℓ ≥ 3, the proof is similar to the B3C game.
Lemma 4. The ℓ-B3C game with ℓ ≥ 3 based on the gadget of Fig. 1 does not have any maximal Nash equilibrium. This implies
that for any n ≥ 6, there is an instance of ℓ-B3C game with n players that does not have any maximal Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the cluster connected to node D, we define tk to be the number of nodes in the cluster with length at most
k far away from D. Since three clusters are identical, tk is the same in all clusters. Obviously, we have tk ≥ tk−1.
Consider one maximal graph G in which B connects to D and C connects to E (as in Fig. 1). The betweenness of node B is
that btwB(G) = r(tℓ−2 + 1). In this case, B can change its strategy to connect to F instead of D, so that its betweenness is
increased to r(tℓ−2 + 1)+ r(tℓ−3 + 1). Therefore, maximal graph G is not stable.
The second case to consider is that both B and C connect to the same node, say E. In this case, they split equally among
all shortest paths from the additional nodes to the triangle nodes and the clusters nodes, giving each of them a betweenness
(r(tℓ−2 + 1)+ r(tℓ−3 + 1)+ r(tℓ−4 + 1))/2 for ℓ ≥ 4 or (r(tℓ−2 + 1)+ r(tℓ−3 + 1))/2 for ℓ = 3. In this case, each of them
could improve their betweenness to r(tℓ−2 + 1)+ r(tℓ−3 + 1) by connecting to F instead of E. Hence, this maximal graph is
not stable either.
All other maximal graphs are rotationally equivalent to one of the above two graphs. Therefore, we know that none of
the maximal graphs is stable, and the theorem holds. 
However, the gadget in Fig. 1 does not work for the case of ℓ = 2. We now construct a separate gadget for ℓ = 2 in Fig. 2.
The outgoing edges for nodes A, B, C,D and the two edges from X and Y point to each other are fixed as shown in the gadget.
Node X can establish at most one edge to a node in {A,D}, while node Y can establish at most one edge to a node in {B, C}.
We classify nodes and edges as follows. Nodes X and Y are flexible nodes since they can choose to connect one node in
{A,D} and {B, C} respectively. Nodes A, B, C,D are rectangle nodes. Edges (X, A), (X,D), (Y , B), (Y , C) are flexible edges (in
the figure dotted arrows and dashed arrows represent conflicting choices of flexible edges, e.g. (X, A) and (X,D) cannot be
selected at the same time). Other edges shown in the figure are fixed edges. The remaining pairs with no edge connected
(e.g. (X, B), (X, C), etc.) are referred to as forbidden edges.
We use the parameters (n, b, c, w) of a 2-B3C game to realize the gadget. In particular, (a) n = 6; (b) b(i) = 1 for all
i ∈ V ; (c) c(i, j) = 0 if (i, j) is a fixed edge, c(i, j) = 1 if (i, j) is a flexible edge, c(i, j) = M > 1 if (i, j) is a forbidden edge;
and (d)w(i, j) = 1 for all i, j ∈ V .
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Fig. 2.Main structure of the gadget that has no maximal Nash equilibrium for 2-B3C games, while dotted arrows and dashed arrows represent conflicting
choices of flexible edges from a node.
With the above construction, we can show the following theorem.
Lemma 5. The 2-B3C game based on the gadget in Fig. 2 does not have any maximal Nash equilibrium. This implies that for any
n ≥ 6, there is an instance of ℓ-B3C game with n players that does not have any maximal Nash equilibrium, and in the game only
the edge costs are nonuniform.
Proof. Note that in a maximal graph all fixed edges are included, and nodes X and Y each selects one edge to connect to
one node in {A,D} and {B, C} respectively. We now show that this maximal graph is not stable, by discussing the following
cases separately.
(1) Node X connects to A and node Y connects to B. In this case, the only path that can contribute betweenness to node Y is
X → Y → B. But there is another shortest path X → A → B. So we have btwY (G, 2) = 1/2. However, if Y changes its
strategy to connect to node C , it can gain betweenness 1 from the unique shortest path X → Y → C . So Y is not at its
best response position.
(2) Node X connects to D and node Y connects to B. Here the only path that can contribute betweenness to node X is
Y → X → D. But there is another shortest path Y → B → D from Y to D. Thus btwX (G, 2) = 1/2. Now if X changes its
strategy to connect to node A, it can gain betweenness 1 from the unique shortest path Y → X → A. So X is not at its
best response position.
(3) Node X connects to A and node Y connects to C . This case is equivalent to case (2), thus is not stable.
(4) Node X connects to D and node Y connects to C . This case is equivalent to case (1), which is also not stable.
In summary, each of X and Y uses the strategy such that its outgoing neighbor points to the outgoing neighbor of the
other node, making an endless dynamic in the game.
Therefore, we know that none of the maximal graphs is stable, so the gadget of Fig. 2 does not have any maximal Nash
equilibrium.
For n > 6, we can use 6 nodes of them to build the above gadget and make all other nodes’ outgoing edges forbidden
edges. It is easy to see that there is still no maximal Nash equilibrium in this graph, thus the theorem holds. 
Therefore, the following theorem is obtained by Lemmas 4 and 5.
Theorem 6. For any ℓ ≥ 2 and n ≥ 6, there is an instance of ℓ-B3C game with n players that does not have any maximal Nash
equilibrium.
3.2. Hardness of determining the existence of maximal Nash equilibria
In this section we use the gadget given in Fig. 1 as a building block to show that determining the existence of maximal
Nash equilibria given a nonuniform B3C game is NP-hard. In fact, we use strict Nash equilibria to obtain a stronger result.
We define a problem TwoExtreme as follows. The input of the problem is (n, b, c, w) as the parameter of a B3C game.
The output of the problem is Yes or No, such that (a) if the game has a strict Nash equilibrium, the output is Yes; (b) if the
game has no maximal Nash equilibrium, the output is No; and (c) for other cases, the output could be either Yes or No. It is
easy to see that both deciding the existence of maximal Nash equilibria and deciding the existence of strict Nash equilibria
is a stronger problem than TwoExtreme, because their outputs are valid outputs for the TwoExtreme problem by Lemma 2.
The following theorem shows that even the weaker problem TwoExtreme is NP-hard.
Theorem 7. The problem of TwoExtreme is NP-hard.
Proof Outline.We reduce the 3-SAT problem to TwoExtreme. In particular, we provide a polynomial-time transformation
from any 3-SAT instance to a B3C game instance as the input of TwoExtreme. Given a 3-SAT instance, we construct the B3C
instance such that if a maximal graph G of the game is stable, Gmust be an ’assignment graph’ (Lemma 8), which is a class
of graphs in which the edge choices of some particular nodes ‘encode’ a truth assignment of variables of the 3-SAT instance.
We then show the following two properties:
(a) (Lemma 11) any non-satisfiable 3-SAT instance is transformed into a game that has no maximal Nash equilibrium.
We prove this by showing that if the 3-SAT instance is non-satisfiable, then some part of the assignment graph G can be
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Fig. 3. The structure of the instance of a B3C game corresponding to an instance of a 3-SAT problem.
reduced to the gadget in Fig. 1 (Lemmas 9 and 10). Thus by an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3, we
can show that it has no maximal Nash equilibrium.
(b) (Lemma 14) any satisfiable 3-SAT instance is transformed into a game that must have a strict Nash equilibrium.
Suppose the 3-SAT instance has a satisfying assignment f . We first show that there exists a maximal assignment graph G of
the game corresponding to f (Lemma 12). Then based on G we will construct a new graph G′ and show that G′ is indeed a
strict Nash equilibrium(Lemma 13).
The above two properties ensure that we can use the Yes/No answer of the TwoExtreme as the answer to the 3-SAT
instance.
Proof. The detail of the transformation is as follows. Each 3-SAT instance has t variables {x1, x2, . . . , xt} and m clauses
{C1,C2, . . . ,Cm}. Each variable x has two literals x and x¯. Each clause has three literals from three different variables. We
use the following construction to obtain an instance of a B3C game with parameters (n, b, c, w) from the 3-SAT instance,
which is illustrated by Fig. 3.
Each clause Cj is mapped to the core of gadget of Fig. 1, which is the substructure of the gadget excluding the additional
nodes and the cluster nodes. We use Bj and Cj to represent the flexible nodes in the gadget and Dj, Ej and Fj to represent
the triangle nodes in the gadget, all corresponding to the clause Cj. This leads to 5m nodes in the graph. There is a special
node A called the assignment node, with fixed edges pointing to all flexible nodes Bj and Cj in all gadgets corresponding to
all clauses.
Each variable xi is mapped to a structure with four nodes Pi,Qi, Li, and L¯i. Node Pi has two fixed edges pointing to Li and
L¯i. Node Li and L¯i, called literal nodes, each may have one flexible edge pointing to either Qi or the assignment node A. For
each clause Cj with three variables xi1 , xi2 and xi3 , we add one fixed edge from Dj to each of Pi1 , Pi2 and Pi3 respectively.
In order to realize the above structure, we set the parameters (n, b, c, w) of the B3C game as follows. First, n = 1+4t+5m
and b(i) = 1 for all i ∈ V . Next, same as in Fig. 1, each fixed edge has cost 0, each flexible edge has cost 1 (so that the
corresponding starting node can choose at most one flexible edge), and each forbidden edge has cost M > 1. Finally, the
weight function has to be carefully set as follows to make the reduction work. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, w(A,Dj) = w(A, Ej) =
w(A, Fj) = w(Dj, Fj) =w(Ej,Dj) =w(Fj, Ej) = 1; for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, w(Pi, A) = w(Pi,Qi) = a for some constant a > 2m;
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (a) if clause Cj contains variable xi, then w(Pi, Bj) = w(Pi, Cj) = w(Fj, Li) =
w(Fj, L¯i) = 1; and (b) if literal xi (or x¯i) is in clause Cj, thenw(Li,Dj) = d (orw(L¯i,Dj) = d), for some constant d > 1. For all
other pairs (u, v) not included above,w(u, v) = 0.
We consider maximal graphs of the game in which all fixed edges are present and exactly one flexible edge from each
node in {Li, L¯i | i = 1, 2, . . . , t} ∪ {Bj, Cj | j = 1, 2, . . . ,m} is present. We say that a maximal graph G of the game is an
assignment graph if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, there is exactly one edge from {Li, L¯i} to A in G. The following is a sequence of
Lemmas that leads to the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 8. If a maximal graph G of the game is stable, G must be an assignment graph.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that G is not an assignment graph. Then for some i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, both Li and L¯i connect
to Qi or to A. Suppose they both connect to Qi. The only shortest paths that pass through Li and L¯i and have nonzero weights
are ⟨Pi, Li,Qi⟩ and ⟨Pi, L¯i,Qi⟩. Sincew(Pi,Qi) = a, we have btwLi(G) = btwL¯i(G) = a/2. In this case, Li can change its strategy
to connect to A instead of Qi to obtain G′. In G′, Li is on the only shortest path from Pi to A, and thus btwLi(G
′) = a > btwLi(G).
Therefore, G is not stable, contradicting to the assumption of the lemma.
Now suppose that both Li and L¯i connect to A. They split the shortest paths from Pi to A, which contributes a/2 to
the betweenness of Li and L¯i each. Among other possible shortest paths that pass through Li or L¯i, the only nonzero
weight ones are from Pi to Bj and Cj for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Since Li and L¯i equally split these shortest paths, we have
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btwLi(G) ≤ a/2+
∑m
j=1(w(Pi, Bj)+w(Pi, Cj))/2 = a/2+m. In this case, Li can change its strategy to connect to Qi instead
of A to obtain G′. In G′, Li is on the only shortest path from Pi to Qi, so btwLi(G
′) = a > a/2+ m since a > 2m. Therefore, G
is not stable, again contradicting to the assumption of the lemma. Hence, Gmust be an assignment graph. 
Lemma 9. If the 3-SAT instance does not have a satisfying assignment, then for any maximal assignment graph G, there always
exists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and all literals v ∈ {Li, L¯i}, edge (v, A) being in G impliesw(v,Dj) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that the 3-SAT instance does not have a satisfying assignment and G is a maximal assignment graph. The
edges pointing to A in G correspond to a truth assignment to variables in the 3-SAT instance: If edge (Li, A) is in G, assign
variable xi to true; if edge (L¯i, A) is in G, assign variable xi to false. Since the 3-SAT instance is not satisfiable, for the above
assignment, there exists a clause Cj that is evaluated to false. For any variable xi not in Cj we havew(Li,Dj) = w(L¯i,Dj) = 0
by our definition of theweight function. Sowe only consider a variable xi appearing inCj. If edge (Li, A) is inG, we assign xi to
true, and sinceCj is evaluated to false, we know that literal x¯i is inCj. Then by our definition,w(L¯i,Dj) = b butw(Li,Dj) = 0.
The case when (L¯i, A) is in G has a symmetric argument. Therefore, the lemma holds. 
Lemma 10. For a maximal assignment graph G, if there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and all literals
v ∈ {Li, L¯i}, edge (v, A) being in G impliesw(v,Dj) = 0, then G is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider such a graph Gwith j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} satisfying the condition given in the lemma. Consider the shortest paths
that pass through Bj and Cj. Since all literal nodes that connect to A have zeroweights toDj (and thus also to Ej and Fj), the only
shortest paths passing through Bj and Cj that have nonzero weights are paths from A to Dj, Ej and Fj. This essentially reduces
the gadget corresponding to Cj to the gadget in Fig. 1 with one additional node A and no cluster nodes. By an argument
similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3, no matter how Bj and Cj currently connect to nodes in {Dj, Ej, Fj}, one of them
will always want to change its strategy to connect to one node in {Dj, Ej, Fj} that is next to what the other current connects
to (according to the direction of the triangle) to increase its utility. Therefore, G is not a Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma 11. If the 3-SAT instance does not have a satisfying assignment, then the constructed B3C game instance has no maximal
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that the B3C game instance has a maximal Nash equilibrium G. By Lemma 8 Gmust be
an assignment graph. Since the 3-SAT instance does not have a satisfying assignment, by Lemmata 9 and 10 G is not stable,
a contradiction. 
Lemma 12. If the 3-SAT instance has a satisfying assignment, then there exists a maximal assignment graph G of the game in
which for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and literal v ∈ {Li, L¯i} such that the edge (v, A) is in G andw(v,Dj) = d.
Proof. Suppose that the 3-SAT instance has a satisfying assignment f . construct a maximal assignment graph G such that
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, if variable xi is assigned to true in the assignment f , then Li connects to A; otherwise, L¯i connects to A.
For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, since clause Cj is evaluated to true under assignment f , there exists variable xi whose corresponding
literal in Cj is evaluated to true. If literal xi is in Cj , xi is assigned to true. By the above construction of G, (Li, A) is in G, and by
the definition of the weight function,w(Li,Dj) = b. The same argument applies to the case when literal x¯i is inCj. Therefore,
the lemma holds. 
Lemma 13. Given a maximal assignment graph G in which for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and literal
v ∈ {Li, L¯i} such that the edge (v, A) is in G and w(v,Dj) = d, we construct a graph G′ such that G′ is the same as G except
that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, both Bj and Cj are connected to Dj in G′. The maximal graph G′ must be a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We prove that in G′ any strategy change strictly decreases the changers betweenness, and thus G′ must be a
nontransient Nash equilibrium.
We go through all nodes and check all possible strategy changes in the following list.
• For each node Qi, i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, it has only the empty strategy so there is no strategy change for Qi.• For each node Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, the only change of the strategy is to remove one or both of the edges (Pi, Li) and (Pi, L¯i).
Suppose variable xi appears in clause Cj. Then we know that Dj connects to Pj (since G′ is maximal). By the definition of
the weight functionw(Fj, Li) = w(Fj, L¯i) = 1. Thus paths from Fj to Li and L¯i through Pi contribute positive values to the
betweenness of Pi. If Pi were to remove edge (Pi, Li) or (Pi, L¯i) or both, Pi’s betweenness would strictly decrease.• For each node Li, i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, its strategy change is either removing its flexible edge or changing its flexible edge. If it
removes its flexible edge, it loses the shortest path from Pi to Qi or A, and sincew(Pi,Qi) = w(Pi, A) = a, its betweenness
strictly decreases. If it changes its flexible edge, then both Li and L¯i connects to Qi or A. By the same argument as in the
proof of Lemma 8, its betweenness strictly decreases.
• For each node L¯i, i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, the argument is the same as the argument for Li.• For node A, it can remove any of edges (A, Bj) or (A, Cj), for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Suppose it removes edge (A, Bj) in G′. Let xi
be a variable in Cj. Since G′ is an assignment graph, Pi has a shortest path connecting to Bj through Li or L¯i and A. Since
w(Pi, Bj) = 1, this shortest path contributes 1 to the betweenness of A in G′. If A removes edge (A, Bj) in G′, there will
be no path from Pi to Bj and A’s betweenness will decrease by 1. Therefore, any strategy change of A strictly decrease its
betweenness.
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• For each node Bj, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, it can either remove its flexible edge or change its flexible edge. By the assumption of
the Lemma, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and literal node v ∈ {Li, L¯i} such that the edge (v, A) is in G and w(v,Dj) = b.
Suppose that there are t such literal nodes v. By the definition of w, we know that t ≤ 3. Since Bj at least splits the
shortest paths from v and A to Dj, btwBj(G
′) = (tb+ 3)/2 ≥ (b+ 3)/2. If Bj removes its flexible edge (Bj,Dj), it will not
connect to any node and its betweenness will decrease to zero. If Bj changes its flexible edge to (Bj, Ej) to obtain a graph
G′′, it loses the share on the shortest paths from v and A to Dj but gain the full share on the shortest paths from A to Ej
and Fj. Then btwBj(G
′′) = 2 < (b+ 3)/2 ≤ btwBj(G′) since b > 1. So Bj’s betweenness strictly decreases. If Bj changes its
flexible edge to (Bj, Fj), it loses the share on the shortest paths from v and A to Dj and Ej and only gains the full share on
the shortest paths from A to Fj, so it is worse than the above case. Therefore, all strategy changes on Bj strictly decreases
Bj’s betweenness.
• For each node Cj, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the argument is the same as the argument for Bj.
• For each node Dj, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, it can change its strategy by removing its fixed edge to Ej and/or removing some of its
fixed edges to some Pi’s. If it removes its edge to Ej, it loses the shortest path from Fj to Ej withweight 1, so its betweenness
strictly decreases. If it removes any edge to some node Pi, it loses shortest paths from Fj to Li and L¯i with weight 1, so its
betweenness strictly decreases. Therefore, Di cannot change its strategy.
• For each node Ej, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, it can change its strategy by removing its fixed edge to Fj. This however will cause Ej
losing the shortest path from Dj to Fj with weight 1, so its betweenness strictly decreases.
• For each node Fj, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, it can change its strategy by removing its fixed edge to Dj. This however will cause Fj
losing the shortest path from Ej to Dj with weight 1, so its betweenness strictly decreases.
By the above argument exhausting all possible cases, we show that graph G′ is indeed a nontransient Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma 14. If the 3-SAT instance has a satisfying assignment, then the constructed B3C game instance has a strict Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. This is immediate from Lemmata 12 and 13. 
The entire proof for Theorem 7 is now complete with Lemmata 11 and 14. 
The immediate consequence of the above theorem is:
Corollary 15. Both deciding the existence of maximal Nash equilibria and deciding the existence of strict Nash equilibria of a B3C
game are NP-hard.3
We now address the NP-hardness for the ℓ-B3C game. By a close inspection of the proof above, we see that all critical
paths that matter are of length at most 3. Therefore, we know that for ℓ ≥ 3, both deciding the existence of maximal Nash
equilibria and deciding the existence of strict Nash equilibria for an ℓ-B3C game are also NP-hard.
For the case of ℓ = 2, we rely on the gadget we developed for ℓ = 2 that we mentioned in Section 3.1 to show that the
decision problem is still NP-hard
Theorem 16. For ℓ = 2, both deciding the existence ofmaximal Nash equilibria and deciding the existence of strict Nash equilibria
in an ℓ-B3C game are NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce the problem from the 3-SAT problem. Each 3-SAT instance has k variables {x1, x2, . . . , xk} andm clauses
{C1,C2, . . . ,Cm}. Each variable x has two literals x and x¯. Each clause has three literals from three different variables. We
use the following construction to obtain an instance of a 2-B3C game with parameters (n, b, c, w) from the 3-SAT instance,
which is illustrated by Fig. 4.
The overall idea of the reduction is as follows. First, each clause Cj is mapped to the gadget similar to the gadget in Fig. 1
while each literal xi and x¯i are mapped to the gadget containing nodes Li, L¯i, Pi,Qi. We call nodes Li’s and L¯i’s literal nodes.
Nodes Li and L¯i can either point to node Qi or all of the nodes Xj. Wemake sure that those literal nodes pointing to nodes Xj’s
correspond to an assignment. Next, if the 3-SAT instance has a satisfying assignment, we show that for each clause Cj, there
exist shortest paths from some literal nodes to Aj with significant weights. We show that these paths make the gadget for
clause Cj stable. Thus all gadgets are stable and the configuration is a maximal Nash equilibrium. We further argue that it
is a strict Nash equilibrium by examining all other alternatives of all nodes and showing that they strictly decrease nodes’
betweenness. Finally, if the 3-SAT instance has no satisfying assignment, there must exist at least one clause Cj such that
there is no path from the literal nodes to Aj with nonzero weights. When this is the case, the gadget corresponding to Cj will
not be stable and thus the game has no Nash equilibrium.
All of the solid arrows in the graph are called fixed edges. They are {(Pi, Li), (Pi, L¯i), (Xj, Yj), (Yj, Xj), (Aj, Bj), (Bj,Dj),
(Dj, Cj), (Cj, Aj), (Xj, Pi), (Dj, Yj) | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}. All of the dashed arrows and dotted arrows represent conflicting
3 In fact, the decision problem for any intermediate concept betweenmaximal Nash equilibrium and strict Nash equilibrium is also NP-hard. For example,
deciding the existence of nontransient Nash equilibria [10] is also NP-hard because any strict Nash equilibrium is a nontransient Nash equilibrium while
the existence of a nontransient Nash equilibrium implies the existence of a maximal Nash equilibrium in B3C games.
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Fig. 4. The structure of the instance of a 2-B3C game corresponding to an instance of a 3-SAT problem. Solid arrows represent fixed edges, while dotted
arrows and dashed arrows represent conflicting choices of flexible edges from a node.
choices of flexible edges starting from one node (e.g. edge (L1,Q1) cannot be selected together with any edge (L1, Xj)). They
are {(Li,Qi), (L¯i,Qi), (Li, Xj), (L¯i, Xj), (Xj, Aj), (Xj,Dj), (Yj, Bj), (Yj, Cj) | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
We set the parameters (n, b, c, w) of the ℓ-B3C game as follows. First, n = 4k+6m. The budgets of all nodes are 0 except
b(Li) = b(L¯i) = m and b(Xj) = b(Yj) = 1. The costs of all fixed edges are 0. The costs of all flexible edges are 1 except
c(Li,Qi) = c(L¯i,Qi) = m. The costs of all other edges (which is forbidden edges) are larger than m. Finally, the weight
function has to be carefully set as follows to make the reduction work. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, w(Xj, Li) = w(Xj, L¯i) =
w(Yj, Pi) = w(Li, Yj) = w(L¯i, Yj) = 1,; for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, w(Pi,Qi) = ma, w(Pi, Xj) = w(Pi, Yj) = a for
some constant a; for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, w(Xj, Bj) = w(Xj, Cj) = w(Yj, Aj) = w(Yj,Dj) = w(Cj, Bj) = w(Bj, Cj) = w(Aj,Dj) =
w(Dj, Aj) = w(Bj, Yj) = w(Dj, Xj) = 1; for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if literal xi (or x¯i) is in clause Cj, then
w(Li, Aj) = b (orw(L¯i, Aj) = b), for some constant b > 1. For all other pairs (u, v) not included above,w(u, v) = 0.
We consider maximal graphs of the game in which all nodes exhaust their budget. Then, for all nodes Li and L¯i, they point
to Qi or the nodes Xj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m in G. We call the second case pointing to the clause nodes. We say that a maximal graph
G of the game is an assignment graph if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there is exactly one node from {Li, L¯i} pointing to Qi in G. Thus, the
other node points to the clause nodes.
Lemma 17. If a maximal graph G of the game is stable, G must be an assignment graph.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that G is not an assignment graph. Then for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, both Li and L¯i connect
to Qi or to Xj. Suppose they both connect to Qi. The only shortest paths that pass through Li and L¯i and have nonzero weights
are ⟨Pi, Li,Qi⟩ and ⟨Pi, L¯i,Qi⟩. Since w(Pi,Qi) = ma, we have btwLi(G) = btwL¯i(G) = ma/2. In this case, Li can change its
strategy to connect to the clause nodes instead of Qi to obtain G′. In G′, Li is on the only shortest path from Pi to Xj, and thus
btwLi(G
′) = m× a > btwLi(G). Therefore, G is not stable, contradicting to the assumption of the lemma.
Now suppose that both Li and L¯i connect to the clause nodes. They split the shortest paths from Pi to Xj, which contributes
ma/2 to the betweenness of Li and L¯i each. By the same reason, Li can change its strategy to connect to Qi instead of Xj to
obtain betweenness valuema. Therefore, G is not stable, again contradicting to the assumption of the lemma. Hence, Gmust
be an assignment graph. 
Lemma 18. If the 3-SAT instance does not have a satisfying assignment, then for any maximal assignment graph G, there always
exists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all literals v ∈ {Li, L¯i}, edge (v, Xj) being in G impliesw(v, Aj) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that the 3-SAT instance does not have a satisfying assignment and G is a maximal assignment graph. The
edges pointing to the clause nodes in G correspond to a truth assignment to variables in the 3-SAT instance: If the node Li
points to the clause nodes in G, assign variable xi to be true; otherwise, assign variable xi to be false. Since the 3-SAT instance
is not satisfiable, for the above assignment, there exists a clause Cj that is evaluated to false. For any variable xi not in Cj we
havew(Li, Aj) = w(L¯i, Aj) = 0 by our definition of the weight function. So we only consider a variable xi appearing in Cj. If
the node Li points to the clause nodes in G, we assign xi to true, and since Cj is evaluated to false, we know that literal x¯i is in
Cj. Then by our definition,w(L¯i, Aj) = b butw(Li, Aj) = 0. The case when L¯i points to the clause nodes in G has a symmetric
argument. Therefore, the lemma holds. 
Lemma 19. For a maximal assignment graph G, if there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all literals
v ∈ {Li, L¯i}, node v pointing to the clause nodes in G impliesw(v, Aj) = 0, then G is not a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Consider such a graph Gwith j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} satisfying the condition given in the lemma. Consider the shortest paths
that pass through Xj and Yj. Since all literal nodes that connect to the clause nodes have zero weights to Aj, the only shortest
paths passing through Xj and Yj that have nonzero weights are paths from Xj to Bj, Cj, from Yj to Aj,Dj, from Li, L¯i to Yj and
from Dj to Xj. The betweenness of pairs from Li, L¯i to Yj and from Dj to Xj are only affected by whether Xj points to Yj and vice
verse. Since these two edges are cost 0, they are always connected in a stable graph. For other pairs, it essentially reduces
the gadget corresponding to Cj to the gadget in Fig. 1. The only difference is that here we have an additional edge (Dj, Yj)
compare to Fig. 1. But the additional edge does not have any infection to the betweenness value of node Xj and node Yj. It only
helps to make the graph a strict Nash equilibrium when needed. We will explain this later in Lemma 22. Therefore, by an
argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3, no matter how Xj and Yj currently connect to nodes in {Aj, Bj, Cj,Dj},
one of them will always want to change its strategy to increase its utility. Therefore, G is not a Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma 20. If the 3-SAT instance does not have a satisfying assignment, then the constructed 2-B3C game instance does not have
maximal Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that the 2-B3C game instance has a maximal Nash equilibrium. Then there exists a
maximal graph G that is stable. By Lemma 17, G must be an assignment graph. Since the 3-SAT instance does not have a
satisfying assignment, by Lemmata 18 and 19, G is not stable, a contradiction. 
Lemma 21. If the 3-SAT instance has a satisfying assignment, then there exists a maximal assignment graph G of the game in
which for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and literal v ∈ {Li, L¯i} such that the node v points to the clause nodes in
G andw(v, Aj) = b.
Proof. Suppose that the 3-SAT instance has a satisfying assignment f . construct a maximal assignment graph G such that
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if variable xi is assigned to true in the assignment f , then Li connects to the clause nodes; otherwise,
L¯i connects to the clause nodes. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, since clause Cj is evaluated to true under assignment f , there exists
variable xi whose corresponding literal in Cj is evaluated to true. If literal xi is in Cj , xi is assigned to true. By the above
construction of G, Li points to the clause nodes in G, and by the definition of the weight function, w(Li, Aj) = b. The same
argument applies to the case when literal x¯i is in Cj. Therefore, the lemma holds. 
Lemma 22. Given a maximal assignment graph G in which for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and literal
v ∈ {Li, L¯i} such that the node v points to the clause nodes in G and w(v, Aj) = b, we construct a graph G′ such that G′ is
the same as G except that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Xj connects to Aj and Yj are connected to Cj in G′. The maximal graph G′ must be
a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We prove that in G′ any strategy change strictly decreases the changers betweenness, and thus G′ must be a strict
Nash equilibrium.
We go through all nodes and check all possible strategy changes in the following list.
• For each node Qi, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it has only the empty strategy so there is no strategy change for Qi.• For nodes other than Li, L¯i, Xj, Yj (1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ m), they only have fixed edge to choose, so we only need to
prove that for each fixed edge, there exists a pair with nonzero weight such that if the node removes this fixed edge, the
betweenness value will decrease. We call this pair pushes such fixed edge.
For node Pi, pair (Xj, Li) pushes edge (Pi, Li)while pair (Xj, L¯i) pushes edge (Pi, L¯i).
For node Aj, pair (Cj, Bj) pushes edge (Aj, Bj). For node Bj, pair (Aj,Dj) pushes edge (Bj,Dj). For node Cj, pair (Dj, Aj)
pushes edge (Cj, Aj). For node Dj, pair (Bj, Cj) pushes edge (Dj, Cj)while pair (Bj, Yj) pushes edge (Dj, Yj).• For each node Li, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, its strategy change is either removing its flexible edge or changing its flexible edge. If
it removes its flexible edge, it loses the shortest path from Pi to Qi or Xj, and since w(Pi,Qi) = a and w(Pi, Xj) = a/m,
its betweenness strictly decreases. If it changes its flexible edge, then both Li and L¯i connects to Qi or Xj. By the same
argument as in the proof of Lemma 17, its betweenness strictly decreases. For each node L¯i, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the argument
is the same as the argument for Li.• For each node Xj, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, it can remove its fixed edge or remove its flexible edge or change its flexible edge. For
the fixed edge, pair (Yj, Pi) pushes edge (Xj, Pi) and pair (Li, Yj) or (L¯i, Yj)) pushes edge (Xj, Yj). Then, we only consider
the betweenness value caused by the flexible edge. By the assumption of the Lemma, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
literal node v ∈ {Li, L¯i} such that the node v points to the clause nodes G and w(v, Aj) = b. Suppose that there are t
such literal nodes v. By the definition of w, we know that t ≤ 3. Since Xj splits the shortest paths from v to Aj and Yj
to Aj btwXj(G
′, 2) = tb + 1/2 ≥ b + 1/2. If Xj removes its flexible edge (Xj, Aj), it will not connect to any node and its
betweenness will decrease to zero. If Xj changes its flexible edge to (Xj,Dj) to obtain a graph G′′, it does not connect nodes
v and Aj but gain the full share on the shortest paths from Yj to Dj. Then btwXj(G
′′, 2) = 1 < b+1/2 ≤ btwXj(G′, 2) since
b > 1. So Xj’s betweenness strictly decreases. Therefore, all strategy changes on Xj strictly decreases Xj’s betweenness.• For each node Yj, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, it can remove its fixed edge or remove its flexible edge or change its flexible edge. For
the fixed edge, pair (Dj, Xj) pushes edge (Yj, Xj). For the flexible edge, by the same argument in Theorem 3, all strategy
changes on Yj strictly decreases Yj’s betweenness.
By the above argument exhausting all possible cases, we show that graph G′ is indeed a strict Nash equilibrium. 
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Lemma 23. If the 3-SAT instance has a satisfying assignment, then the constructed 2-B3C game instance has a strict Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. This is immediate from Lemmata 13 and 21. 
The entire proof of Theorem 16 is now complete with Lemmata 20 and 23. 
Note that in the above proof, edge costs and weights are nonuniformwhile node budgets are uniform. And the following
theorem summarizes the hardness for the ℓ-B3C game.
Theorem 24. For any ℓ ≥ 2, both deciding the existence of maximal Nash equilibria and deciding the existence of strict Nash
equilibria in an ℓ-B3C game are NP-hard.
4. Complexity of computing best responses
The best response of a node in a configuration of the uniform game is the strategy of the node that gives the node the best
utility (i.e. best betweenness). In this section, we show the complexity of computing best responses first for uniform games
and then extend it for nonuniform games.
In a uniformgamewithparameters (n, k), one can exhaustively search all
n−1
k

strategies and find the onewith the largest
betweenness. Computing the betweenness of nodes given a fixed graph can be done by all-pair shortest paths algorithms in
polynomial time (e.g. [11]). Therefore, the entire brute-force computation takes polynomial time if k is a constant. However,
if k is not a constant, the result depends on ℓ, the parameter bounding the shortest path length in the ℓ-B3C game.
For ℓ = 2, we show that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a best response in a uniform ℓ-B3C game.
To reach this result, we first need the following lemma.
Lemma 25. Let G = (V , E) be a directed graph. For a node v in G, let Gv,S be the graph where v has outgoing edges to nodes
in S ⊆ V \ {v} and all other nodes have the same outgoing edges as in G. Then we have for all S ⊆ V \ {v}, btwv(Gv,S, 2)
=∑u∈S btwv(Gv,{u}, 2).
Proof. Let S = {v1, . . . , vk}. Consider any shortest path of length 2 from a node u to a node u′ that passes through node v.
The path must be u → v → u′, which means u′ = vi for some i. So btwv(Gv,S, 2) can be written as
btwv(Gv,S, 2) =
−
vi∈S
 −
u≠v≠vi,m(u,vi,2)>0
mv(u, vi, 2)
m(u, vi, 2)

.
Suppose nowwe change S to a single vertex set {vi} for some i. The value ofmv(u, vi) andm(u, vi)will not change because
none of these paths goes through any other edges that start from v. On the other hand, mv(u, vj) will become 0 if j ≠ i. So
we have
btwv(Gv,{vi}, 2) =
−
u≠v≠vi,m(u,vi,2)>0
mv(u, vi, 2)
m(u, vi, 2)
.
Compare the formulas of btwv(Gv,S, 2) and btwv(Gv,{vi}, 2). We know that
btwv(Gv,S, 2) =
−
1≤i≤k
btwv(Gv,{vi}, 2)
Therefore, the lemma holds. 
The lemma shows that for 2-B3C game, the betweenness of a node can be computed by a simple sum of the its
betweenness when adding each of its outgoing edges alone into the graph.
Theorem 26. Computing a best response in a uniform ℓ-B3C game when ℓ = 2 can be done in O(n3) time.
Proof. Consider a graph G with n nodes and k outgoing edges for each node. For any node v in G, let btwv(u, 2) be the
betweenness value of node v if v chooses {u} as its strategy. We can compute btwv(u, 2) using the following method: for
each node w where (w, v) ∈ G, if (w, u) ∈ G, then node v will not get any betweenness value from the path from w
to u. If (w, u) /∈ G, let m(w, u, 2) be the number of length-two paths (which are the shortest paths) from w to u. Notice
that m(w, u, 2) can be computed in O(n) time by enumerating the intermediate node of the path. Node v gains 1m(w,u,2)
betweenness value from these paths. Adding such values for all node w where (w, v) ∈ G together, we can get btwv(u, 2)
in O(n2) time.
Then we can compute btwv(u, 2) for all nodes u ≠ v in O(n3) time, and by Lemma 25, the top k nodes with the largest
btwv(u, 2) values will form the best response for node v. The sorting and selecting only cost O(n log n) time. Thus the whole
algorithm can be done in time O(n3). 
For ℓ ≥ 3, we show that the task of computing a best response in a uniform ℓ-B3C game is NP-hard. This also implies
that the task is NP-hard in the B3C game without path length constraint. To show the result, we define its decision problem
version below.
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Fig. 5. Structure corresponding to a set cover instance.
For ℓ ∈ N, we define a decision problem ℓ-BestResponse as follows. The input of the problem includes (a) a directed
graph G = (V , E) with n nodes and each node has k outgoing edges; (b) a natural number k, (c) one node v in G, and (d) a
natural number b. The output is Yes or No. Let Sv be a strategy of v (i.e., Sv ⊆ V \ {v} and |Sv| = k). Let Gv,Sv be the graph
where v uses strategy Sv and all other nodes have same outgoing edges as in G. The output of the problem is Yes if and only
if there exists a strategy Sv of node v such that btwv(Gv,Sv , ℓ) ≥ b.
Theorem 27. For all ℓ ≥ 3, problem ℓ-BestResponse is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce this problem from the set cover problem. Given an instance of the set cover problem ⟨U, S, t⟩, in which U
is a universe and S is a family of subsets of U with |U| = n, |S| = m, and t is a natural number. The problem is to determine
whether there are at most t subsets in S whose union is the universe. We construct an instance of the betweenness problem
as follows (see Fig. 5).
• Let r be the maximum size of subset in T , i.e., r = max{|s| | s ∈ S}.
• Let t ′ = min(t,m), x = max(r − t ′, 0), k = t ′ + x.
• We use k+ 1 nodes to form a clique so that each node has out degree k. These nodes are used to absorb links from other
nodes that would otherwise do not have k outgoing edges.
• We set node B to be the one we need to compute the best response for.
• We set node A to connect to B and another k− 1 nodes in the clique;
• We set n element nodes v1, . . . , vn to correspond to n elements in U , and they connect to arbitrary k nodes in the clique;• Weadd xnewelements toU to formanewuniverseU ′. Then set xnewelements nodes vn+1, vn+2, . . . , vn+x to correspond
to them. Connect these new nodes to arbitrary k nodes in the clique;
• We add x new subsets to S to form a new family of subsets S ′, where the ith subset contains only one element vn+i
(1 ≤ i ≤ x). Then set m + x subset nodes s1, . . . , sm+x to correspond to m + x subsets in S ′ (here sm+1, sm+2, . . . , sm+x
are set to correspond to the new added subsets). For a slight abuse of notation, we use vi to denote both the node in the
graph and the element in U ′, and sj to denote both the node in the graph and the subset in S ′. We connect sj to all node
vi if vi ∈ sj, because |sj| ≤ r ≤ k, we can always make such connections. For subsets have less than k nodes, we connect
them arbitrarily to nodes in the clique to increase their out-degree to k.
The decision problem in the game is to determine whether node B can choose a set of edges of size at most k that make
its betweenness at least n+ x+ k.
Lemma 28. If there is a cover of size at most t whose union is the universe U, then node B can choose a set of edges of size at most
k that makes its betweenness to be at least n+ x+ k.
Proof. Suppose that the cover which satisfies the requirement is C . Without loss of generality, we can assume that |C | = t ′.
Let node B connects to the subset nodes si for all si ∈ C and all the new added subset nodes sm+j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ x. In this
case, B stands on the shortest paths from A to the k subset nodes, and thus gains betweenness k from these shortest paths.
Since∪si∈C si = U and∪1≤i≤xsm+i = U ′\U , according to the construction of the structure, B can reach all n+x element nodes{v1, . . . , vn+x} and B stands on all the paths from A to the elements nodes. Hence they contribute n+ x to the betweenness
of B. So betweenness of B is at least n+ x+ k. This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 29. If node B can find a set of edges of size at most k that makes its betweenness to be at least n+ x+ k, then there is a
cover of size at most t whose union is the universe U.
Proof. We first prove that B can achieve the best betweenness by connecting to k subset nodes sj’s.
Node B’s betweenness comes from the shortest paths from A to other nodes. If B connects to a node L not in the clique, it
will not gain any betweenness from the paths from A to B to L and then to any clique node, because A can reach k− 1 clique
nodes directly and the remaining two clique nodes in one more step, but the paths through B and L have length at least 3.
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Since k ≤ m+ x, if B connects to any nodes other than the subset nodes, it will lose a connection to some subset node sj.
We argue case by case below that it will not give a better betweenness than B connecting to some subset node instead.
• Node B connects to some element node vi. It can gain at most 1 by the shortest path from A to vi via B, since vi only
connects to clique nodes, and we have already argued that the path from A to B to vi and then to clique nodes are not
shortest paths. In this case, B can instead connect to an available subset node sj not yet connected, by which it gains
betweenness of at least 1, no worse than the connection to vi.• NodeB connects to some cliquenode L. IfAhas a direct connection to L,Bwill not gain anybetweenness by this connection.
If A does not have direction connection to L, ⟨A, B, L⟩ is a shortest path of length 2, but there are k−1 other shortest paths
from A to L. Thus B gains betweenness of at most 1/k. In this case, B is better off connecting to an available subset node sj.• Node B connects to node A. This does not contribute any betweenness to B, so B is better off connecting to an available
subset node sj.
Therefore, node B can achieve the best betweenness by connecting to k subset nodes. Let these k subset nodes form a set
C ′. In this case, the betweenness of B is k+ | ∪si∈C ′ si|, because only through B node A can reach all k subset nodes in C ′ plus
nodes in∪si∈C ′si, but for the clique nodes A has shorter paths to reach themnot through B. Since B can achieve a betweenness
of at least n + x + k, we know that | ∪si∈C ′ si| ≥ n + x, which means that C ′ must cover all the element nodes. Also notice
that sm+i is the only subset that contains element vm+i. So C ′ must all the new added subset nodes sm+i (1 ≤ i ≤ x). Then
let C = C ′\{sm+1, . . . , sm+x}. We know C must have k− x = t ′ elements and can cover {v1, . . . , vm}. Thus C is a solution to
the set cover instance. 
The proof of Theorem 27 is now complete with Lemmata 28 and 29. 
Remark 1. Although it is well known that set cover problem cannot be approximated in polynomial time to within a factor
of c · ln n, where c is a constant.We cannot directly apply this inapproximability result to the ℓ-BestResponse problem using
a similar proof. Whether problem ℓ-BestResponse can be approximated efficiently is still left open.
Theorem 27 can be directly applied to both B3C games without path length constraint and the nonuniform ℓ-B3C games
for ℓ ≥ 3. For nonuniform ℓ-B3C games with ℓ = 2, however, our polynomial-time algorithm does not work any more. In
the non-uniform version, we define a decision problem 2-NBestResponse as follows. The input of the problem contains (a)
a 2-B3C game with parameter (n, b, c, w); (b) a configuration s of the game; (c) one node v in graph G; and (d) a natural
number A. The output is Yes or No. Let Sv be a strategy of v and Gv,Sv be the graph that node v uses strategy Sv and all other
nodes use the same strategies in configuration s. The output of the problem is Yes if and only if there exists a strategy Sv of
node v such that btwv(Gv,Sv , 2) ≥ A. In Lemma 30 we prove the problem is reducible from the knapsack problem.
Lemma 30. Problem 2-NBestResponse is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce this problem from the knapsack problem. Given an instance of the knapsack problem ⟨U,w, value⟩, in
which setU containsm items. Each itemUi = (wi, valuei) has its weightwi and its value valuei. The problem is to determine
whether we can pick items from the set U such that the total weight does not exceedw but the total value is at least value.
We construct an instance of the betweenness problem as follows. There are m + 2 nodes u, v, v1, . . . , vm in the
graph. The edge (u, v) is the fixed edge, and the edge (v, vi) for i = 1, . . . ,m are flexible edges. Other edges in the
graph are forbidden edges. We use the parameters (n, b, c, w) of 2-B3C game as follows. In particular, (a) n = m + 2;
(b) b(v) = w, b(u) = b(vi) = 0(i = 1, . . . ,m); (c) c(v, vi) = wi(i = 1, . . . ,m), c(u, v) = 0 and c(i, j) = M > w for all
other edges; and (d)w(u, vi) = valuei(i = 1, . . . ,m). The knapsack instance has a solution exceeding value if and only if
the 2-B3C instance has a configuration such that the betweenness of node v exceeds value. 
Therefore, for nonuniform ℓ-B3C games, computing a best response is NP-hard even for ℓ = 2. Combined these results,
we summarize as follows.
Theorem 31. It is NP-hard to compute the best response in either a nonuniform 2-B3C game, or an ℓ-B3C game with ℓ ≥ 3
(uniform or not), or a B3C game without path length constraint (uniform or not).
5. Nash equilibria in uniform games
In this section we focus on uniform ℓ-B3C games. we first define a family of graph structures called shift graphs and show
that they are able to produce Nash equilibria for B3C games. We then study some properties of Nash equilibria in uniform
games.
5.1. Construction of Nash equilibria via shift graphs
We first define shift graphs and non-rotational shift graphs. Then we show that for any ℓ, k and any ℓ′ ≥ ℓ, the non-
rotational shift graphswith n = (ℓ′+ k)!/k! nodes are all Nash equilibria in the uniform ℓ-B3C game with parameter n and k.
Moreover, we use shift graphs to construct strict Nash equilibria for both ℓ-B3C games and B3C games without path length
constraint, for certain combinations of n and kwhere k = Θ(√n).
Definition 4. A shift graph G = (V , E) with parameters m, t ∈ N+ and t ≥ m, denoted as SG(m, t), is defined as follows.
Each vertex of G is labeled by an m-dimensional vector such that each dimension has t symbols and no two dimensions
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have the same symbol appeared in the label. That is, V = {(x1, x2, . . . , xm) | xi ∈ [t] for all i ∈ [m], and xi ≠ xj for all
i, j ∈ [m], i ≠ j}. A vertex u has a directed edge pointing to a vertex v if we can obtain v’s label by shifting u’s label to the
left by one digit and appending the last digit on the right. That is, E = {(u, v) | u, v ∈ V , u[2 : m] = v[1 : (m− 1)]}, where
u[i : j] denote the sub-vector (xi, xi+1, . . . , xj)with u = (x1, x2, . . . , xm).
In the shift graph SG(m, t), we know that the number of vertices is n = t · (t − 1) · · · (t − m + 1) = t!/(t − m)!, and
each vertex has out-degree t − m + 1. Notice that the definition requires that m dimensions have all different symbols. If
they are allowed to be the same, then the graphs are the well-known De Bruijn graphs, whereas if we require only that the
two adjacent dimensions have different symbols, the graphs are Kautz graphs, which are iterative line graphs of complete
graphs.
Definition 5. A non-rotational shift graphwith parameterm, t ∈ N+ and t ≥ m+ 1, denoted as SGnr(m, t), is a shift graph
with the further constraint that if (u, v) is an edge, then v’s label is not a rotation of u’s label to the left by one digit. That is,
E = {(u, v) | u, v ∈ V , u[2 : m] = v[1 : (m− 1)] and u[1] ≠ v[m]}, where u[i] denotes the i-th element of u.
Graph SGnr(m, t) also has t!/(t − m)! vertices but the out-degree of every vertex is t − m. A simple non-rotational shift
graph SGnr(2, 4) is given in Fig. 6 as an example. Non-rotational shift graphs have the following basic properties.
Proposition 1. Non-rotational shift graph SGnr(m, t) satisfies the following properties:
(1) It is Eulerian, i.e., every vertex has the same in-degree t −m.
(2) It is vertex-transitive.
(3)When t ≥ m+ 2, it is strongly connected, with diameter at most 2m(m+ 1).
(4) For m ≥ 2, it is the line graph of SGnr(m− 1, t)with all edges on the smallest circles of the line graph removed; for m = 1,
it is simply t-clique (completely connected t-vertex directed graph with no self-loop).
Proof. (1) and (2) are straightforward by definition.
(3): We first prove the following claim.
Claim 1. For any node v = (x1, . . . , xm), there exist a length m+ 1 path from v to node u = (x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xm)
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m and y ≠ xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, j ≠ i.
Proof. Notice that t ≥ m+ 2, so there must exist a symbol t such that t ≠ xi(1 ≤ i ≤ m) and t ≠ y. Then we can construct
the following path:
v = (x1, x2, . . . , xm)
→ (x2, x3, . . . , xm, t)
→ (x3, . . . , xm, t, x1)
→ (x4, . . . , xm, t, x1, x2)
· · ·
→ (xi+1, . . . , xm, t, x1, . . . , xi−1)
→ (xi+2, . . . , xm, t, x1, . . . , xi−1, y)
→ (xi+3, . . . , xm, t, x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1)
· · ·
→ (x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xm) = u
It is easy to check that each step here is a valid edge in G and the total length ism+ 1. 
Having this claim, nowwe can use it as a subroutine. Consider two nodes v = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) and u = (y1, y2, . . . , ym) in
G. In order to find a path from v to u, we first reach a node v1 that satisfy v1[1] = y1 fromnode v using the followingway: if y1
exists in node v’s label, namely xj = y1 for some j, then we first go from node v to nodew1 = (x1, . . . , xj−1, t, xj+1, . . . , xm)
usingm+ 1 steps, here t is a symbol that does not appear in node v’s label. If y1 does not appear in v’s label, we can just let
w1 = v. Then from node w1, we can reach node v1 = (y1, x2, . . . , xj−1, t, xj+1) in m + 1 steps. Thus total length from v to
w1 is no more than 2(m+ 1).
Using the similar way, we can find a path from vi to some node vi+1 with length nomore than 2(m+1), where vj satisfies
vj[t] = yt for all 1 ≤ t ≤ j. Thus finally we will reach vm = u, and the total path length is no more than 2m(m+ 1).
(4): According to the definition of line graph, each edge (u, v) in SGnr(m− 1, t)will become a new vertex t . Suppose the
labels for u, v in SGnr(m − 1, t) are u = (x1, x2, . . . , xm−1) and v = (x2, . . . , xm−1, y) where y ≠ x1. Then we can label the
new vertex t = (x1, . . . , xm−1, y), which is a valid label in SGnr(m−1, t). And it is easy to check that every edge (s, t) in this
line graph satisfies s[2 : m] = t[1 : m − 1]. Thus the line graph is just the shift graph SG(m, t). Since the smallest circles
in SG(m, t) have length m and every edge (s, t) in such circles has form s[2 : m] = t[1 : m − 1], s[1] = t[m]. Thus after
removing these edges, we get exactly the non-rotational shift graph SGnr(m, t). 
Moreover, non-rotational shift graphs have one important property that leads to their being Nash equilibria of ℓ-B3C
games, as we now explain.
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Fig. 6. Non-rotational shift graph SGnr (2, 4).
We say that a vertex v in a graph G is ℓ-path-unique if any path that passes through v (neither starting nor ending at v)
with length no more than ℓ is the unique shortest path from its starting vertex to its ending vertex. A graph is k-out-regular
if every vertex in the graph has out-degree k. A k-out-regular graph is an ℓ-path-unique graph (or ℓ-PUG for short) if every
vertex in the graph is ℓ-path-unique.
Lemma 32. Non-rotational shift graph SGnr(ℓ, k+ ℓ) is an ℓ-PUG.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there exist two nodes s and t , such that there are two paths from s to t which both
have length no more than ℓ, which are denoted as below:
s = a1 → a2 → · · · → aℓ1 = t and
s = b1 → b2 → · · · → bℓ2 = t,
where (ai, ai+1) and (bi, bi+1) are all edges in this graph, 1 < ℓ1, ℓ2 ≤ ℓ + 1. Let i be the smallest index such that
ai ≠ bi(1 < i ≤ ℓ). Since ai−1 = bi−1, we have ai[1 : ℓ − 1] = ai−1[2 : ℓ] = bi−1[2 : ℓ] = bi[1 : ℓ − 1]. So it must
be that ai[ℓ] ≠ bi[ℓ]. We also know that ai[ℓ] = ai+1[ℓ − 1] = · · · = aℓ1 [ℓ − ℓ1 + i] = t[ℓ − ℓ1 + i]. Similarly we have
bi[ℓ] = t[ℓ− ℓ2+ i]. So t[ℓ− ℓ1+ i] ≠ t[ℓ− ℓ2+ i], which means ℓ1 ≠ ℓ2. So one of themmust be less than ℓ+ 1. Suppose
ℓ1 < ℓ+ 1, we have
s[ℓ1] = a1[ℓ1] = a2[ℓ1 − 1] = · · · = aℓ1 [1] = t[1]
If ℓ2 < ℓ+ 1, use the same way we can get s[ℓ2] = t[1] = s[ℓ1]. But this cannot be true since ℓ1 ≠ ℓ2 and the symbols
must be all different in one label. So ℓ2 = ℓ + 1. Then we have t[1] = bℓ+1[1] = b2[ℓ]. But according to the definition,
b2[1 : ℓ − 1] = b1[2 : ℓ] = s[2 : ℓ] and t[1] = b2[ℓ] ≠ b1[1] = s[1] (the no rotation requirement in SGnr() graphs). This
implies that t[1] cannot be samewith any symbol in s’s label. So t[1] ≠ s[ℓ1], which is a contradiction. Therefore, the lemma
holds. 
The following lemma shows the importance of ℓ-PUG to uniform ℓ-B3C games.
Lemma 33. If a directed graph G has n nodes and is k-out-regular and ℓ-path-unique, then G is a maximal Nash equilibrium for
the uniform ℓ-B3C game with parameter n and k.
Proof. For any node v in G, we want to show that v is at its best response in the current configuration.
Suppose total(v) is the total number of paths with length no more than ℓ that pass through node v (neither starting nor
ending at v) in the current configuration. Note that here we consider all paths, including pathsmay visit some nodemultiple
times. We first show that total(v) is invariant with respect to node v’s strategy and it is an upper bound of v’s betweenness
if v can only change its own strategy.
Let startx(v) be the number of paths with length x that start from node v. Since every node has out-degree k, we know
startx(v) = startx−1(v) ∗ k = · · · = start0(v) ∗ kx = kx, which only depends on x and k and is invariant to the choice of v’s k
outgoing edges.
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Let endx(v) be the number of paths with length x that end at v. Notice that every path with length no more than l that
ends at v will not contain v’s outgoing edges. Otherwise there will be a path from v to itself with length no more than ℓ,
which is not a shortest path (the shortest path is just the node v itself). So endx(v) is independent of node v’s strategy.
Now consider the number of paths with length x that pass through node v (neither starting or ending at v), denoted as
passx(v). We know passx(v) =
−
1≤i≤x−1
endi(v)∗ startx−i(v) =
−
1≤i≤x−1
endi(v) ∗ kx−i. Thus total(v) =
−
2≤x≤ℓ
passx(v) is also
independent of v’s strategy. At the same time, notice that these are the only paths that can contribute to v’s betweenness.
Thus for any strategy sv of node v, we have btwv(sv) ≤ total(v).
On the other hand, in the current configuration G every pathwith length nomore than ℓ that passes v is a unique shortest
path, thus will contribute one to v’s betweenness. So we get btwv(G) = total(v), which means that node v is at its best
response. Therefore the lemma holds. 
With the above result, we immediately have
Theorem 34. For any ℓ ≥ 2, ℓ′ ≥ ℓ, k ∈ N+, graph SGnr(ℓ′, k + ℓ′) is a maximal Nash equilibrium of the uniform ℓ-B3C game
with parameters n = (k+ ℓ′)!/k! and k.
Proof. This is immediate from Lemmata 32 and 33, and from the fact that any ℓ′-PUG is an ℓ-PUG for ℓ′ ≥ ℓ. 
The above construction of maximal Nash equilibria is based on path-unique graphs. Next we show that shift graphs also
lead to another family of Nash equilibria not based on path uniqueness. In fact, we show that they are strict Nash equilibria
for uniform ℓ-B3C games for every ℓ ≥ 2 as well as B3C games without path length constraint.
Definition 6. Given a graph G = (V , E), a vertex-duplicated graph G′ = (V ′, E ′) of G with parameter d ∈ N+, denoted as
D(G, d), is a new graph such that each vertex of G is duplicated to d copies, and each duplicate inherits all edges incident to
the original vertex. That is, V ′ = {(v, i) | v ∈ V , i ∈ [d]}, and E ′ = {((u, i), (v, j)) | u, v ∈ V , (u, v) ∈ E, i, j ∈ [d]}.
Theorem 35. For any t ≥ 2, d ≥ 2, graph D(SG(2, t), d) is a strict Nash equilibrium of the uniform ℓ-B3C game with parameters
n = dt(t − 1) and k = d(t − 1). It is also a strict Nash equilibrium of the uniform B3C game without the path length constraint.
Proof. Let G be the graph D(SG(2, t), d). The nodes in G can be represented as (i, j, δ) where 1 ≤ i ≠ j ≤ t and 1 ≤ δ ≤ d.
The strategy of each node v = (i, j, δ) in configuration graph G is s∗v = {(j, i′, δ′) | 1 ≤ i′ ≠ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ δ′ ≤ d}.
Claim 1. For any node v in G, G\{v} has diameter 2.
Proof: notice that d ≥ 2, and thus for any two nodes u = (i, j, δ) and u′ = (i′, j′, δ′) in G\{v}, there are at least two
length-2 paths from u to u′ in G: one goes through (j, i′, 1) and the other goes through (j, i′, 2). Thus, after removing one
node v, u and u′ are still connected with at least one length-2 path. Claim 1 holds.
With Claim 1, it is immediate that for any possible strategy sv of v and the graph G′ that differs from G only in v’s outgoing
edges, all shortest paths that can contribute to the betweenness btwv(G′) are of length 2. Therefore, btwv(G′) = btwv(G′, ℓ)
for all ℓ ≥ 2. Hence in the following we only show that G is a strict Nash equilibrium for the uniform B3C game without the
path length constraint, and the result immediately applies to the uniform ℓ-B3C games for all ℓ ≥ 2.
Given a vertex v, we fix the strategies for all of the vertices other than v and consider the betweenness value of v under
different choice of v’s strategy. By Lemma 1, we only need to consider maximal strategies of v when computing its best
response. Let sv = {v1, v2, . . . , vk} be a maximal strategy of v. Let btwv(sv) be the betweenness value of vertex v if v
chooses sv as its strategy, and btwv(u) be the betweenness value of v if v changes its strategy to sv = {u} (a non-maximal
strategy). By Lemma 25 and the fact that btwv(G′) = btwv(G′, 2) for all G′ that differs from G only in v’s outgoing edges, we
have
btwv(sv) =
k−
i=1
btwv(vi)
Thus for any vertex v = (i, j, δ), we only need to compare btwv(u) for all of the other vertices u and prove that the largest
d(t − 1) values are exactly from the vertices in s∗v .
By symmetry, we only need to consider vertex v = (2, 1, 1). There are (t − 1)d vertices (i′, 2, δ′) with 1 ≤ i′ ≤ t, i′ ≠
2, 1 ≤ δ′ ≤ d) connecting to vertex v. We divide the outgoing edges of v into seven cases based on their end points
u = (i, j, δ) to compute the corresponding betweenness value btwv(u). We assume 1 ≤ δ ≤ d and i ≠ j.
u = (2, 1, δ) : btwv(u) = 0, since there is already an edge from (i′, 2, δ′) to (2, 1, δ);
u = (i, 1, δ), i ≥ 3 : btwv(u) = (t−1)dd+1 ;
u = (1, 2, δ) : btwv(u) = (t−1)d−1d ;
u = (i, 2, δ), i ≥ 3 : btwv(u) = (t−1)d−1d+1 ;
u = (1, j, δ), j ≥ 3 : btwv(u) = (t−1)dd ;
u = (2, j, δ), j ≥ 3 : btwv(u) = 0, since there is already an edge from (i′, 2, δ′) to (2, j, δ);
u = (i, j, δ), i, j ≥ 3 : btwv(u) = (t−1)dd+1 .
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Fig. 7. Vertex duplicated shift graph D(SG(2, 3), 2).
When t ≥ 3, we have (t−1)dd > (t−1)d−1d > (t−1)dd+1 > (t−1)d−1d+1 > 0. Thus the top k = d(t − 1) vertices with the best
btwv(u) values are (1, j, δ) with 2 ≤ j ≤ t and 1 ≤ δ ≤ d, which is exactly s∗v . Moreover, the sum of btwv(u)’s of these
vertices are strictly larger than the sum of any other subsets of k vertices. Therefore, s∗v is a strict best response and the graph
is a strict Nash equilibrium.
When t = 2, only two cases u = (2, 1, δ) and u = (1, 2, δ) are left, and the k = d best choices are u = (1, 2, δ) with
1 ≤ δ ≤ d, again exactly s∗v . Any other subset of k nodes give strictly lower betweenness. Therefore, the graph is a strict
Nash equilibrium too when t = 2. 
In the simple case of t = 2, graph D(SG(2, 2), d) is the complete bipartite graph with d nodes on each side. For larger t ,
D(SG(2, t), d) is a t-partite graph with more complicated structure. Fig. 7 shows an example of graph D(SG(2, 3), 2). When
d = 2, we have n = 2t(t − 1) and k = 2(t − 1). Thus, we have found a family of strict Nash equilibria with k = Θ(√n).
An important remark is that when d ≥ 2, each node is split into at least two nodes inheriting all incoming and outgoing
edges, and thus graphs D(SG(2, t), d) for all t ≥ 2 and d ≥ 2 are not ℓ-PUGs for any ℓ ≥ 2. Therefore, the construction by
splitting nodes in shift graphs SG(2, t) are a new family of construction not based on path-unique graphs.
5.2. Properties of Nash equilibria
From Lemma 33, we learn that ℓ-PUGs are good sources for maximal Nash equilibria for uniform ℓ-B3C games. Thus we
start by looking into the properties of ℓ-PUGs to obtain more ways of constructing Nash equilibria. The following lemma
provides a few ways to construct new ℓ-PUGs given one or more existing ℓ-PUGs.
Lemma 36. Suppose that G is a k-out-regular ℓ-PUG. The following statements are all true:
(1) If G′ is a k′-out-regular subgraph of G for some k′ ≤ k, then G′ is an ℓ-PUG.
(2) Let v be a node of G and {v1, v2, . . . , vk} be v’s k outgoing neighbors. We add a new node u to G to obtain a new graph G′.
All edges in G remains in G′, and u has k edges connecting to v1, v2, . . . , vk. Then G′ is also an ℓ-PUG.
(3) If G′ is another k-out-regular ℓ-PUG and G′ does not shared any node with G, then the new graph G′′ simply by putting G
together with G′ is also an ℓ-PUG.
The proof of the lemma is straightforward by definition and is omitted. Lemma 36 has several important implications.
First, by repeatedly applying Lemma 36(2) on an existing ℓ-PUG, we can obtain an ℓ-PUG with an arbitrary size. Combining
it with Theorem 34, it immediately implies the following theorem.
Theorem 37. For any ℓ ≥ 2, k ∈ N+, and n ≥ (k+ ℓ)!/k!, there is a maximal Nash equilibrium in the uniform ℓ-B3C game with
parameters n and k.
Next, Lemma 36 implies that there exist rich structures among the Nash equilibria of uniform ℓ-B3C games. In particular,
Lemma 36(3) implies that Nash equilibria may be disconnected, while Lemma 36(2) implies that Nash equilibria may be
weakly connected but not strongly connected. Furthermore, by repeatedly adding new nodes based on Lemma 36(2) such
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that all new nodes connected to the same set of {v1, v2, . . . , vk} nodes, we may have very unbalanced Nash equilibria in
which some nodes have zero in-degree while other nodes have in-degree close to n. This also implies that Nash equilibria
may have some nodes with zero betweenness while other nodes have very large betweenness, that is, we have very unfair
Nash equilibria. Note that Nash equilibria based on shift graphs given in Theorems 34 and 35 are all fair in that all nodes
have the same betweenness.
Finally, we investigate non-PUG maximal Nash equilibria in the uniform 2-B3C game with parameters (n, k), which by
Theorem 26 is the most interesting case since its best response computation is polynomial. We want to see that when we
fix k, whether we can find non-PUG maximal Nash equilibria for arbitrarily large n. Let maxInd(G) denotes the maximum
in-degree in graph G. The following result provides the condition under which all maximal Nash equilibria are PUGs.
Theorem 38. Let G be a k-out-regular graph with n nodes. If maxInd(G) ≤ n−k
k2+k+1 , then G is a maximal Nash equilibrium for the
uniform 2-B3C game with parameter n and k if and only if G is a 2-PUG.
Proof. Lemma 33 already shows the part of sufficient condition. Thus we only need to prove that if G is not a 2-PUG, some
node will have better response in G.
Suppose node v is a node in G that is not 2-path unique. Let S = {u|(u, v) ∈ G}. We know that |S| ≤ maxInd. Then let
S ′ be the set of nodes that can be reached from any node in S in no more than 2 steps. Since every node has out-degree
k, we know that |S ′| ≤ |S| + |S| × k + |S| × k × k = |S| × (1 + k + k2) ≤ maxInd × (1 + k + k2). Also notice that
n ≥ maxInd× (1+k+k2)+k, so there exist at least k nodes that are not in S ′. If we let node v connect to these k nodes, then
every length 2 path that passes through v in the form x → v → ywill be the unique shortest path from x to y, because y is
not reachable from xwithin 2 steps in any other ways. So v is 2-path unique now, and this will give it a better response. 
The above theorem implies that non-PUG equilibria is only possible if maxInd(G) = Θ(n) when k is a constant, which
means that non-PUG equilibria must have very unbalanced in-degrees when n is large. In the following, we show as an
example how to construct such non-PUG equilibria for the case of k = 2.
First, we introduce a general scheme of adding nodes, similar to the one in Lemma 36 (2), such that if the original graph
is non-PUG Nash equilibria with certain properties, then the new graph is still a non-PUG Nash equilibria with the same
properties.
We say that an edge (v, u) in G is shortcut by a nodew if (w, v) and (w, u) is in G. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 39. Suppose that G is a k-out-regular graph in which only one node v is not 2-path unique, and every edge (v, u) in G
is shortcut by at most one node. Let (w, v) be an edge in G, and w has k outgoing neighbors v1, v2, . . . , vk including v. We add
a new node x to G to obtain a new graph G′ such that x connects to v1, v2, . . . , vk and all edges in G remains in G′. Then in G′
only node v is not 2-path unique. If G is a maximal Nash equilibria for the uniform 2-B3C game, then G′ is also a maximal Nash
equilibria.
Proof. First it is easy to see that v is also not 2-path unique in G′ because every path in G is still a path in G′.
For every length 2 path that passes through node v, suppose it is x → v → y. If it is not the unique shortest path from
node x to node y, we must have (x, y) ∈ G, i.e. (v, y) is shortcut by node x. Because otherwise there must exist another node
u such that x → u → y is also a shortest path. But then u is also not 2-path unique, and that will contradict the fact that v
is the only node in G that is not 2-path unique.
Now suppose that G is a maximal Nash equilibria. Let a be the in-degree of node v. Then for each (v, u) ∈ G, since it is
shortcut by at most one node, whichmeans there is at most nodew such that (w, v) ∈ G andw→ v → u is not the unique
shortest path fromw to u. Therefore we have a−1 ≤ btwv(G{u}, 2) ≤ a. Since node v is at its best response in G, along with
Lemma 25 we know that btwv(G{t}, 2) ≤ a− 1 for every node t where (v, t) /∈ G
NowconsiderG′with newnode x in it. First is obvious to see that every node inG′ except node v is still at its best response.
And we have btwv(G′{u}, 2) = btwv(G{u}, 2) + 1 for every node u ≠ x, u ≠ v. Because there is exactly one more unique
shortest path x → v → u that contribute betweenness value to edge (v, u). Thus we have a ≤ btwv(G′{u}, 2) ≤ a+ 1 when
(v, u) ∈ G and btwv(G′{u}, 2) ≤ a when (v, u) /∈ G. Also notice that btwv(G′{x}, 2) ≤ a because path x → v → a is not a
shortest path. So we know node v is also at its best response in graph G′, thus G′ is a maximal Nash equilibria too. 
Fig. 8 shows a Nash equilibria for the uniform 2-B3C game with n = 10, k = 2, which we found by our experiments. In
this graph, only one node is not 2-path unique and every edge out of this node is shortcut by at most one node. This means
that, at least for k = 2, we apply the scheme of Lemma 39 to Fig. 8 to generate arbitrarily large graphs that are still non-PUG
Nash equilibria.
Theorem 38 can also be used to eliminate some families of graphs with balanced in-degrees as maximal Nash equilibria.
We now show that a family of symmetric graphs called Abelian Cayley graphs cannot be Nash equilibria of uniform 2-B3C
games. AnAbelian Cayley graph G = (V , E) is a graph generated by the additive groupZn = {0, 1, . . . , n−1} and a generating
set A ⊆ Zn of size k, such that V = Zn and E = {(x, y) | x, y ∈ Zn, ∃z ∈ A, y = x + z mod n}. We denote such a graph by
⟨Zn, A⟩.
It is easy to see that Abelian Cayley graphs are not 2-PUGs when k ≥ 2. Let z1, z2 ∈ A, and y = x + z1 + z2 mod n
for some x ∈ Zn. Then from node x to node y, there are at least two length-two paths, one passing through w1 = x + z1
mod n and the other passing through w2 = x + z2 mod n. Therefore none of the nodes in an Abelian Cayley graph is
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Fig. 8. A Nash equilibrium for the uniform 2-B3C game with n = 10, k = 2 that is not a 2-PUG. The number next to a vertex is its betweenness value. The
vertex with betweenness 5 is not 2-path-unique.
2-path unique. Moreover, it is clear that every node in the Abelian Cayley graph has in-degree k. Therefore, by Theorem 38
we have the following result.
Corollary 40. For any n ≥ k3 + k2 + 2k, any Abelian Cayley graph ⟨Zn, A⟩with |A| = k is not a maximal Nash equilibria for the
uniform 2-B3C game with parameters n and k.
6. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we present results on bounded budget betweenness centrality (B3C) game, a type of network formation
games in which nodes in the network try to strategically select other nodes to connect subject to the budget constraint in
order tomaximize their betweenness centrality in the network.We focus on ℓ-B3C game, where shortest paths contributing
to betweenness have path length constraint of at most ℓ, whichmatches realistic scenarios and generalizes the work of [15].
We present both hardness results for the nonuniform version of the game and constructive existence results for the uniform
version of the game. We also study the complexity of computing best response in the game.
There are still a number of issues and open problems to be address in future research on betweenness-centrality (or
other network measures) based network formation games. One issue is that the Nash equilibrium structures found so far
is rather limited and unnatural. This is often a limitation in other studied network formation games as well. For example,
Nash equilibria studied in [15] have to be dense graphs and the structures found are layered complete graphs, and the
Nash equilibria found in the game of [16] are tree-like structures. One important open question is whether more natural
phenomena of networks, such as scale-free and small-world phenomena, cannaturally emerge fromsuchnetwork formation
games. The second issue is related to solution concepts. In our betweenness game, computing best response is NP-hard
except for the case of uniform game with ℓ = 2. This means that individuals cannot in general find their best responses.
Thus a future direction is to study equilibria that based on feasible computations of individuals. Moreover, individual’s
computation is better be local since it is unlikely that individuals know the entire network structure. This is also an issued
shared by other studies of network formation games and should be improved upon. Another issue is tomodel interaction and
information diffusion in a more realistic way. For example, pure undirected links and pure directed links are two extremes
of real-world interactions. Canwemodel unsymmetric and fractional interaction between individuals? Also, in this paper as
well as a number of other papers information diffusion between a pair of nodes are only through their shortest paths. A future
directionwould be to study other diffusionmodels such as randomwalks and their corresponding network formation games.
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